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Introduction
From the 1950s, the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union shifted increasingly to what is broadly termed the Third World. As part of this
contest, both sides pursued what today might be termed a development agenda: large-
scale economic aid in the forms of loans, technology, and expertise to help countries
escape poverty. Although the purpose of this aid was to showcase the superiority of
each side’s respective system, the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective
allies shared a great deal in terms of how they conceptualized economic growth, the
sort of projects they implemented, and even their understanding of the role of the
state.1
Theorists in both camps also saw the creation of a professional, urban middle class
as crucial for economic and cultural progress. Primary and higher education were seen
as crucial to the broader development agenda by indigenous elites, development
scholars, and policymakers. As Dianne Davis explains, modernization theory, in vogue
in the 1960s, assigned a crucial developmental (“morally superior and generative”) role
to the middle classes. That changed dramatically in subsequent decades. As Davis puts
it: “When modernization theory held sway in the field of development, middle classes
danced on center stage; when modernization theory fell out of favor, replaced initially
by dependency or world-system theory and then a variety of state-centered paradigms,
middle classes swiftly exited the theoretical limelight.”2 This change of paradigm
suggests that tracking the course of the Afghan middle class allows a comparison of
the different developmental approaches deployed by international donors and by the
Afghan ruling elites.
In keeping with the themes of this dossier, particularly its focus on the implemen-
tation and appropriation of developmental ideologies, metrics, and hierarchies, this
essay explores the various efforts to create an Afghan middle class through three
periods: first under the Musahiban dynasty (until 1973) and republic (1973–78); second
during the communist period and Soviet intervention (1978–92); and third since the
United States–led invasion in 2001. Drawing on archival research (for the Cold War
period) and oral histories (especially for the post-2001 period), we seek to place the
development programs of each era into broader context, while pointing to the similar-
ities and differences between First and Second World approaches. We also compare
the Cold War period, when state-led modernization was in vogue, and the current
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era, when the role of the state is minimized and NGOs are a dominant part of the
development landscape.
Afghanistan presents an interesting case study in how international donors and
Afghanistani elites implemented similar yet competing visions of development. From
the 1950s, Afghanistan’s rulers pursued a modernization drive for which they sought
and received U.S. and Soviet (and, to a lesser extent, East and West German, Indian,
and Japanese) support. By 1963, demands from intellectuals for democracy, and power
struggles within the royal family, led King Zahir Shah to support a liberal consti-
tution, leading to a ten-year period sometimes called “New Democracy.” In 1973, the
king’s cousin Mohammed Daud, who had served as prime minister in the 1950s,
ousted the monarch with support from military officers and intellectuals who were
dissatisfied with the slow pace of social and economic change and with the growth of
corruption under the king, thus inaugurating the republican period. Throughout the
monarchical and republican years Afghanistan managed to remain neutral in the Cold
War, although Soviet influence was increasingly dominant in the military, which the
United States, wary of antagonizing Pakistan, did not want to aid. This changed in
1978, when communists with support in the military came to power, precipitating a
series of events that led to the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Throughout the
ensuing occupation, Moscow continued to supply economic aid; with the withdrawal
in 1989, however, this aid declined, and by 1991 there were hardly any Soviet advisers
left in the country. A civil war followed, which led to a new group, the Taliban,
taking control of most of the country by the late 1990s. Since 2001, finally, Afghan-
istan has once again seen an influx of aid and expertise, primarily from the United
States and European countries in the context of the United States–led NATO inter-
vention.
The two interventions—Soviet and American—thus provide interesting case
studies of “transformative” occupations. In both cases, large-scale changes in society
were believed by occupiers and their clients alike to be necessary for the success of the
occupation. At the same time, social transformation became not just a precondition
for stabilization but the very purpose of occupation. Arguably, the Soviet occupation
sought to deepen and extend the reach of a modernizing state that been the goal of
the Afghan regimes of the 1960s and 1970s that preceded the communists. Following
the 2001 intervention, meanwhile, the international community sought to help
institute a political regime in accordance with Western perceptions and views, while
attempting, with no great success, to draw on local traditions.3 And although the
political system that emerged in Afghanistan after 2001 resembled in some ways that
of the 1960s, characterized as both were by competitive elections that were not free of
government and powerbroker manipulation, that is where the similarities ended. In
the economic field, by the 2000s the talk was no longer of modernization but of rapid
economic growth driven by donor-funded infrastructural development and by the
private sector. The 2001–14 period was stable as far as the political elite was concerned,
in large part due to the presence of Western troops, which kept the ruling coalition
together somehow.
In a study of the professional middle class, educational institutions necessarily
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occupy a special place. This essay indeed dedicates much space to them. The devel-
opment of educational institutions with the help of outside powers did not begin in
the Cold War period. Indeed, colonial powers also established schools and even
universities with the aim of creating a competent indigenous elite loyal to the
metropole.4 The organization, administration, and curricula of these schools and
colleges were thus geared toward these ends. Although formal colonial empires were
on their way out by the 1950s, the legacies of these educational arrangements carried
over and were in some cases replicated in the post–Cold War world. Educational
institutions in newly independent states tried to create citizens loyal to new national
governments; and the influx of aid and advice was accompanied by an expectation
that these new cadres would be, at the very least, favorably disposed to the donor
nations.5 This remained true after 2001, despite the end of the Cold War. At the same
time, as we will see, both First World and Second World educational aid sought to
help create modern subjects with many common attributes in spite of the donors’
competing ideologies.
We focus on a period in Afghanistan’s history (1960–2013) that saw an exponential
expansion of the state motivated in part by First and Second World development
ideologies that were dominant in those decades. In the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan’s
monarchical and republican rulers tried to create an urban middle class to advance
their modernization agenda. Expanding educational opportunities within Afghanistan
and abroad helped this strategy, although it presented the government with a new set
of problems: how to employ an ever-growing pool of graduates while limiting their
politicization. After the Soviet intervention, the urban middle class continued to grow,
but the issue of unemployed graduates that had already appeared in the 1970s only
intensified. Although the state remained weak, the expansion of an educated middle
class was one of the very real effects of this policy. Some scholars have recently
critiqued the tendency to follow the “modernization paradigm” common in the histo-
riography on Afghanistan in the twentieth century, and the resulting Weberian
histories, which focus on the state while leaving aside other possible accounts.6 While
we believe this criticism is just, we focus on the urban middle class not as a privileged
and reified incarnation of political modernity but precisely because its creation was a
stated goal of Afghanistan’s various governments and the foreign powers that funded,
promoted, and helped draw up development programs.
Education and the Making of an Urban Middle Class in Afghanistan in the
1960s and 1970s
Barnett Rubin and others have identified Amir Habibullah’s reign (ruled 1901–19) as
the period when an Afghan intelligentsia first appeared, united by ideas of progress
inspired in part by reforms in the Ottoman Empire and by modernist trends in British
India.7 This intelligentsia, despite helping to shape the reform agenda of Amir
Amanullah (r. 1919–29) and leaving a lasting legacy, was nevertheless small. Amanullah
fell from power in 1929, but the new dynasty in Kabul in the 1930s also shared the
vision of the same Afghan modernist intelligentsia and inherited their links with
modernists in India and beyond.8 Prior to World War II, Afghanistan flirted with
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accepting large-scale German aid and advice, but British pressure prevailed against
this idea. The larger-scale development projects of the 1950s and 1960s, however,
created the need for a large number of people educated in the natural sciences, capable
of administering the growing state and economics institutions and ready to staff the
expanding primary school system. Credit available under the Truman administration’s
Point IV program, combined with the dollar surplus accumulated in the interwar due
to high external demand for Karakul wool, meant that Afghanistan for the first time
had the opportunity to import technology and expertise on a massive scale. Facing a
consolidating Pakistani state with which it shared a contested border and in the
context of the global emergence of new nation-states with ambitious development
goals, Afghanistan’s rulers (the dynasty and political elite that supported it) decided
to pursue a modernization program that included infrastructure, electrification, and
the transformation of agriculture. They also tried to establish a planning system to
help direct these developments, bringing in Indian, Dutch, and Soviet advisers to help
organize the planning department. The priorities of Afghanistan’s government were
consistent with those of other postcolonial states, where elites saw large-scale economic
development as crucial to the survival of the state. Indeed, state building and devel-
opment were assumed to go together—a state was needed to pursue development, but
development would also help strengthen the state.
But by the early 1950s, Afghanistan’s development programs had already hit certain
obstacles.9 Among the most important, in the eyes of Western analysts, was a lack of
qualified personnel. In a 1953 article, the economist Peter Franck, then completing his
Ph.D. at Berkeley and working as a consultant for U.S. government agencies and
foundations, found “underdeveloped government,” by which he meant both weakness
of political structures and lack of qualified personnel, to be at the core of Afghanistan’s
problems. He concluded his discussion of Afghanistan’s development difficulties:
Unless the level of understanding among the presently illiterate is raised and the
best use made of those already highly trained, much of our worry about instability
and economic stagnation in Afghanistan will be with us for a long time. But this
is one link in the strangling chain of incompetence and underdevelopment that
can be strengthened—without incurring political and economic fireworks.10
Soviet advisors to the Afghan government—and Afghanistan’s leaders themselves—
reached the same conclusion in the same period. Georgii Ezhov, a Soviet translator
and economic adviser who worked in Afghanistan from the 1950s, recalled that one of
the greatest problems in organizing planning was finding qualified people who could
carry out the work.11
The 1950s thus saw a rapid expansion of higher education in a bid to remedy the
issue. A school of medicine, which would become part of Kabul University, had been
established in 1932. Foreign teachers arrived from India, France, and Germany to teach
in the secondary schools in Kabul.12 In the 1950s, the Soviet Union, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the United States began supporting the development of
the university.13 Columbia University, meanwhile, oversaw a teacher-training
program, intended to “create an educational system dedicated to creating a new gener-
ation with skills, attitudes and values required in a more dynamic and modernizing
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environment.”14 As a result of such efforts in the 1950s, a 1971 United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) report would call Kabul University the
“primary indigenous institution for training the top leadership needed for social and
economic modernization.”15
The expansion of Soviet- and U.S.-funded road works, oil and gas exploration,
agricultural modernization, and factories from the 1950s required technical personnel
at all levels. In the short term, as with teaching, the solution was to import specialists
en masse, often housing them either in settlements meant to resemble U.S. suburbs
or housing projects modeled on those in the postwar USSR (the famed Kabul mik-
rorayon). Some of these specialists were supposed to train Afghans on the job; for the
more elite professions, however, the Soviets agreed to construct a technical college in
Kabul and several small ones for the oil and transport industries.16 In addition, thou-
sands of students were sent to study in the Soviet Union, the United States, and other
countries. Education was also supposed to provide social mobility. By the early 1970s,
Soviet economic advisers and their interlocutors had developed a system to recruit
promising workers for further study in the USSR. Soviet-trained Afghan teachers at
the Kabul Polytechnic would help identify students who might be interested in
studying in the Soviet Union, organized preparatory studies, and examined potential
recruits.17 In all, the USSR helped train over 70,000 skilled laborers, technicians, and
engineers, according to Soviet government figures.18
The focus on educational achievement and qualifications meant that higher
education, including training abroad, increasingly became a precondition for
membership in the state elite. Before 1953, according to Barnett Rubin, only 12.6
percent of the elite (which he defines as those in senior government positions and
state appointed judges) had formal postsecondary education. During Daoud’s
premiership from 1953 to 1963, 70 percent of the elite had some higher education, and
this reached 89 percent in the New Democracy period from 1963 to 1973.19 The 1950s
also saw the recruitment of Eastern Pashtuns with foreign (Western) education into
the state elite, while the New Democracy period, by contrast, saw less emphasis on
Pashtun recruitment and more on Persian-speaking Kabuli elites. Rubin sees this as
evidence of the increasing importance of relations rather than origins for appoint-
ments, as well as the decreasing emphasis on Pashtun nationalism during the New
Democracy period.20
Meanwhile, the expansion of primary schooling created a large pool of potential
students for the university and various technical colleges. The variable quality of this
primary education, as well as the importance of family connections and origins,
however, limited access to higher education and thus to the new elite. Training at one
of the elite high schools was still the best way to get a chance at education at Kabul
University or in a Western institution. Children of the Kabul elite (both Persian
speakers and Mohammadzai Pashtuns, the tribe to which the royal family belonged)
dominated the student body of these high schools. Rubin points out that while
Mohammadzai Pashtuns were more likely to go to the West if they were to pursue
foreign military training, other Pashtuns went to the Soviet Union. Western education
was still considered more prestigious (and more selective, since the United States
accepted relatively few military officers for training).21
PAGE 359
Kalinovsky and Giustozzi: The Professional Middle class in Afghanistan 359
................. 19032$ $CH7 06-09-17 14:00:28 PS
PAGE 360
360 Humanity Summer 2017
Table 1. Education and health statistics, 1932–78
Number of Number of Number of University Number of
Year Schools Pupils Teachers Students Doctors
1311 / 1932 22 1,350 105
1315 / 1936 92 9,275 309
1320 / 1941 331 64,000 2,190 38
1325 / 1946 359 93,544 2,677 88
1330 / 1951 378 98,743 3,128 461 137
1335 / 1955 804 126,092 4,007 758 149
1340 / 1961 1,436 235,301 5,983 1,987 250
1345 / 1965 2,298 443,459 9,824 3,451 527
1351/ 1971 3,972 760,469 21,920 7,732 827
1974 10,956
1978 21,118
Derived from Maxwell J. Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic
Development (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 14, and Barnett R. Rubin, “The Old Regime in Afghanistan: Recruitment
and Making of a State Elite,” Central Asian Survey 10, no. 3 (1991): 73–100.
Not surprisingly, the schools, colleges, and universities sponsored by the USSR
and Washington also served as demonstrations of the two political systems and their
visions of modernity. Soviet teachers and administrators were expected to conduct
“political work” among students. Soviet-sponsored institutions included libraries with
Soviet books and magazines, such as the Persian-language Akbar, devoted to life in
Soviet Central Asia, as well as Sputnik, an illustrated digest of Soviet news published
for foreign audiences. A teacher noted happily that students tended to sneak these
magazines out of the library but did not return them.22 Teachers were expected to
“ably discuss” social and political questions “from the position of Marxist-Leninist
interpretations of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.”23
Of course, Soviet and U.S. visions of modernity were similar in many ways, and
this is also visible in their approach to education and the creation of a professional
class. Western sociologists noted the need for professionals who were future-oriented
and rational as a “precondition for development” and the importance of a modern-
izing elite that would be charged with “the articulation of development goals and
supervision of development strategies.”24 Soviet teachers, likewise, saw the creation of
new subjects out of “traditional” boys and girls as part of their job. A teacher in
Mazar-i-Sharif, for example, noted that most of her students were children of mullahs
or traders, and their views tended to be conservative, but:
Over the last two years the views of students have changed. The students began to
notice that Afghans do not know how to work, that much time is spent on prayer
and rest. They became interested in such questions as where life on earth and man
came from. They started questioning certain positions in the Koran. In dreaming
about the future of their country, they said that they wished that Afghanistan
would have many schools, that all the boys would study, that the factories would
belong to the people, they dreamed about the development of science and tech-
nology in their country, and about flying to space. Some students thought that
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having land, sheep, money, it is not necessary to work, let those work who do not
have anything. But all the other students changed their mind.25
The report may not be a good indication of what was actually happening among
students, but it says a great deal about the kind of subject Soviet educational aid was
supposed to create—“future-oriented,” having faith in science and technology,
thinking in terms of national progress, and with desires for himself and his country
that are geared, through the underpinning binary of modernization theory, toward
“modern” conceptions (formal, Westernized education, space travel) rather than
“traditional” ones (land, sheep).
By the 1970s, state education had expanded markedly in Afghanistan, thanks in
no small part to foreign aid. Kabul University had produced Afghan specialists in all
fields. Yet the consequences were different from those expected by the theorists and
planners of the 1950s. First, the quality of both teachers and graduates was often low,
especially in key fields like engineering, to the point where some Western observers
urged withholding accreditation.26 Second, job opportunities for graduates were
limited, and the government was forced to hire them into the bureaucracy.27 Third,
and perhaps most consequential, the expansion of education brought students into
contact with new ideas and debates. For many, the discussion of political and social
problems became more important than their actual studies. Sultan Ali Kishtmand,
who would later go on to serve as prime minister in the communist government of
the 1980s, followed the path from lyce´e to Kabul University, becoming more politi-
cized at each step through his conversations with teachers and fellow students.28 At
the university, he writes in his memoir, “days and nights were spent in discussions
about the future of Afghanistan.”29 He and his friends read Jack London, Maxim
Gorky, the Iranian avant-garde writer Sadegh Hedayat, as well as various publications
from the Iranian Tudeh party.30 It was also at university that he met Babrak Karmal,
a student activist who would emerge as one of the leading figures of the communist
movement, and who was installed at the head of the party and state with the help of
Soviet troops in December 1979.
Indeed, both Kabul University and the technical college became highly politicized
places. Already in 1965 student-led protests organized by Babrak Karmal helped force
the resignation of the sitting prime minister, Mohammad Yusuf. By the late 1960s
and early 1970s, however, the leftists were losing their hegemony over the student
body, and Islamist groups began mounting a serious challenge. Islamist opposition to
the Musahiban modernization program coalesced around charismatic teachers like the
theologian Barnahuddin Rabbani and student leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Universities and colleges thus became the primary social base of the Islamists, just as
they were for the radical left.31
We should note that studying with U.S. or Western European teachers did not
necessarily make students predisposed to Western-promoted capitalist development or
liberal political systems. Hafizullah Amin, for instance, a leading hard left figure who
played a crucial role in the 1978 uprising and then led a series of bloody purges against
rivals and allies, ultimately prompting the Soviet invasion, had studied education at
Columbia University and indeed was probably first drawn to Marxism in the United
States.32 Many students of the technical college opposed the leftists, and even among
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those who studied in the Soviet Union there were many who would join the Islamist
opposition.
The Soviet Occupation
The coup that brought the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) to power in 1978 and then triggered the Soviet intervention at the end of
1979 transformed both the middle class and the educational systems that helped create
it. On the one hand, expanding the educational system and bringing more women
into the professional workforce were both avowed goals of the PDPA. In addition, the
expansion of the state apparatus with Soviet support meant that the urban middle
classes grew significantly. But at the same time, the political upheavals and repressions
of those years divided the educated elite that had emerged during the 1960s and 1970s,
sending many into exile.
Higher education was reoriented after the coup toward the USSR and other
socialist countries, which affected the curriculum, training, composition of staff, and
social life at the institutions. The Soviet Union and its allies now provided most of
the “foreign” specialists teaching at Kabul University and were the main destination
for students seeking to study or do graduate work abroad. Many of the older
teachers—including some of the most qualified ones—left after the revolution and
the Soviet intervention: 230 teachers in all, according to a Soviet report. The university
was forced to hire less qualified teachers without graduate training, leading to a decline
in the quality of teaching. By 1984, almost half of the teachers had only the most basic
(licentia or bachelors) degree, while only 15 percent had a doctorate. And though after
1980 teachers were hired who had often completed some graduate training in Soviet
and other East Bloc countries, still, as late as 1985 only 29 percent of those with a
masters or Ph.D. had earned their degrees in the USSR, while the rest had studied in
Germany, France, India, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries.33
Not surprisingly, the PDPA and its Soviet advisers did their best to limit political
life in the university, driving any activity that did not support the ruling party under-
ground. The kinds of alternative political life that had troubled Soviet teachers in
earlier years were no longer easily found. Instead, the main youth organizations were
now the Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth and the Democratic Organization
of Afghan Women, both subordinate to the PDPA and thus operating under the
guidance of Soviet Komsomol advisers.34 We should emphasize here that throughout
the occupation Soviet commanders and advisers believed that they could defeat the
United States–sponsored insurgency only by making the communist regime more
attractive to the population—in part by accelerating the kinds of modernizing
economic development pursued under the aegis of monarchical and then republican
regimes since the 1950s. The expansion of education, while pursued for its own ends,
thus also became a part of the “counterinsurgency” in the 1980s, as it offered the
possibility of distancing young people from elements hostile to the regime. Despite
these efforts the actual level of enthusiasm for the PDPA and for the USSR appeared
quite low to Soviet advisors, who complained that “under a surface calm” was a great
deal of indifference, national pride “bordering on nationalism,” and “distrust towards
the politics of the PDPA.”35
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Table 2. Breakdown of students by social origin, 1984–85
1984 1985
Social group Number % Number %
Workers 1,154 19 820 14
Peasants 969 16 706 12
Intelligentsia 3,366 56 3,946 66
Merchants 147 3 59 0,5
Bourgeoisie 33 1 30 0,5
Craftsmen 269 5 323 5
Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), fond 9606, op. 11, delo 353, and GARF, f 9606, op.
11, d. 354.
As part of this transformative expansion of education under Soviet occupation in
the 1980s, Kabul University actively recruited from sectors of the population that had
previously had little hope of attaining higher education. Thus, as of October 1984 the
university had 5,615 day students and 723 students taking evening courses or studying
in the “workers faculty.” While 56 percent of students were still from the “intelli-
gentsia,” 19 percent were now children of “laborers,” and 16 percent were the children
of peasants. This meant that “laboring classes” represented 35 percent of all students,
9 percent higher than the previous year. Even considering the likelihood that many
students hid their actual social origins so as to avoid ostracism, these figures are
impressive and point to the priorities of the regime and the university adminis-
tration.36 However, during the following year these figures returned to their 1984
levels, pointing to the limits of the more radical aspects of the university’s admissions
and recruitment policies.37
The period of Soviet occupation also saw a transformative influx of women into
educational institutions and the middle class. By 1985 women made up a majority of
the student body: 3,325 out of 5,956 students. Their share of the student body was
particularly large in the faculty of natural sciences, where they accounted for 791 out
of a total contingent of 989 students. Women were also the majority in the faculties
of philology, economy, social sciences, and pharmacology.38
The ongoing conflict also changed the ethnic makeup of the faculty and student
body. From 1983 to 1984, the share of Pashtuns in the former had declined from
around 52 percent to 40 percent, while the share of Tajiks had grown to 52 percent.
The numbers were even more stark for the student body: as of October 1984, 60
percent of students were Tajiks, while only 33 percent were Pashtun. Soviet officials
attributed this change to the concentration of fighting in the “Pashtun zone” along
the Pakistani border where middle schools had largely ceased to function and where
Pashtuns had stopped enrolling in high schools.39 In fact, there were probably other
factors as well, including the distrust of parents toward the ruling group in Kabul,
and the dominance of Tajiks in the first postintervention communist government
under Babrak Karmal, installed with the help of Soviet forces. While pledging party
unity, Karmal had in fact pushed out many of the “Khalqis” in positions of authority.
Since the Khalq segment of the PDPA had more support among Pashtuns, and
Karmal’s Parcham faction of the PDPA found support mainly among Tajiks, his
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Table 3. Breakdown of student body by ethnic group as of October 20, 1984
1984 1985*
Ethnic Group Number of Students % Number of Students %
Pashtun 1,974 33 1,507 25
Tajik 3,551 60 3,886 65
Hazara 203 3 240 4
Baluch 16 0.5
Nuristani 16
Uzbek 106 2 143 3
Turkmen 42 64 1
Indian 17 1.5
Other 14
* For 1985, the number of Baluch, Nuristani, and “others” is given as 108, or 2 percent of the student
population. Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), fond 9606, op. 11, d. 353, and GARF,
f 9606, op. 11, d. 354.
policies led to the further alienation of Pashtuns. It is not surprising that Karmal’s
policies also affected other issues, including university enrollments.40
As the figures for teachers at Kabul University suggest, a large part of the middle
class was either opposed to the PDPA from the beginning or became disillusioned
with it at some point after the revolution. Some of this opposition may have been
ideological, but interviews and the few published memoirs for this period also suggest
that the regime’s paranoid persecution of potential opponents before the Soviet inter-
vention had alienated many intellectuals originally supportive of the regime or at least
predisposed to share its broader goals.41 The Soviet intervention and occupation of
the country further alienated many intellectuals. Among those who joined the resis-
tance to the Soviet Union were graduates not only of Kabul University but also some
who had studied in the USSR. Even many progressive women, whom the revolution
claimed to represent, turned against the communist government.42 Thousands of
others fled abroad, settling in Iran, Europe, and North America.
In this connection, a noteworthy development that presaged future dynamics was
the arrival of NGOs in Afghanistan. The first NGO involved with Afghanistan was
established in 1979 and at the start operated precisely in the refugee camps that were
popping up in Pakistan, close to the Afghan border. More and more NGOs got
involved with Afghanistan in the ensuing decade of Soviet occupation and insurgency.
By 1989 there were forty operating across the border.43 At this point they employed
only a small portion of the middle class, but their number was about to take off, in
ways described below.
Despite these modes of middle-class resistance to and flight from the Soviet occu-
pation, the Soviet-supported regime’s support was also urban and indeed concentrated
in Kabul. In 1986, the only year for which detailed statistics are available, 69 percent
of the party membership was from the capital. The Democratic Youth Organization
of Afghanistan, the local equivalent of the Komsomol, drew 77 percent of its
membership from Kabul.44 Many teachers entered the state bureaucracy, replacing
supporters of the old regime there, and a growing number of women were drawn in
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turn to replace them in the schools. However, the upheavals of the revolution and
emigration made it difficult to expand the size of the medical profession: for the first
half of the 1980s there were only 1,110–1,200 physicians in the country, two hundred
fewer than in 1979. Physicians were also heavily concentrated in Kabul (80 percent).45
The general Soviet policy throughout the intervention was to accelerate the state-
building and development processes they had supported, alongside their American
competitors, since the 1950s. The demands of fighting against the United States-
backed insurgency, and the radical vision of social transformation espoused by the
ruling PDPA, magnified the need for a strong state in the eyes of the regime and its
Soviet backers, even as that state was falling apart. As the evidence above suggests, the
PDPA fought to create a new educated middle class to replace the one it had alienated
or repressed. At the same time, the real and perceived weaknesses of the state led
Moscow to fill the gap with thousands of advisers, who attempted to replicate Soviet
institutions.46 After the departure of the advisers starting in 1986, and of Soviet troops
starting in 1988, the regime of Mohammed Najibullah (Najib) turned increasingly to
militias to stay in power, ultimately further undermining the state it hoped to
preserve.47
The Middle Class, 1992–2001: Surviving in a Time of State Collapse
Under the Rabbani Government
Najibullah’s regime started faltering in the second half of 1991, as the collapse of
the Soviet Union seemed imminent and the newly empowered and hostile Russian
president, Boris Yeltsin, blocked support. Najibullah was ousted in April 1992. The
government that followed was formed by an uneasy coalition of all nine main groups
that had been fighting against Najibullah, with some splinters of the pro-Soviet regime
also demanding inclusion. Unable to agree on power sharing, the new leaders first lost
control over their own military commanders in the provinces and then battled each
other in Kabul. Political authority collapsed and the ability of the central state to
function was jeopardized.
The professional middle class was particularly badly affected by the slow collapse
of the state. Most of the active members of the opposition who were still alive in 1992
had not managed to complete their studies before going underground, but they were
nonetheless appointed to positions of responsibility within the state machinery. The
bulk of government officials, meanwhile, stayed in place, except for those in senior
positions who were almost entirely replaced. The new bosses were often inexperienced
and not fully educated or had been professionally inactive for long years and needed
the advice of the professional classes. Few of those purged by the PDPA in the late
1970s and early 1980s recovered their former positions, mostly because they were not
associated with opposition armed groups or, if they were, were associated with the
weakest ones (typically the royalist parties).48
Infighting among the factions of the old armed opposition meant that by 1993 the
country was already sliding rapidly into a civil war. The professional middle class was
quickest in leaving Afghanistan for neighboring countries, or for Europe when
possible. They had better chances than anybody else to sell their professional skills
abroad.49 Although exact statistics are not available, certainly tens of thousands of
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Table 4. Number of graduates employed by government and students enrolled
in university courses, 1978–2013
1978 2000 2002 2013
Number of graduates and post-graduates
employed by the government 8,921 36,892
Students enrolled in university courses 10,603 3,976 22,717 124,741
Source: Central Statistics Office, Kabul.
educated professionals quit Afghanistan in the 1990s, adding to the smaller (but still
very significant) wave that, as we saw above, had left the country after the 1978 coup.
The migration of a large part of the middle class had a number of long-term conse-
quences, which would become visible after 2001. Apart from the decline in a number
of middle-class professions, these consequences included the education of a growing
number of Afghans abroad, some of whom returned at least temporarily to Afghan-
istan after 2001, and an accelerated generational change within the middle class inside
Afghanistan.
The Rabbani government (1992–96) struggled to pay adequate salaries, and the
country suffered from hyperinflation caused by the unrestrained printing of banknotes
by the government, which was unable to fund its expenditure otherwise. During this
period the real salaries of government bureaucrats collapsed to new lows. The portion
of the professional middle class employed by NGOs was less directly affected by the
collapse of the state and even prospered in some cases, as the NGO presence in the
country continued to grow during this period. Moreover, the income of the NGO-
employed professional middle class was sheltered from inflation, because NGOs paid
their employees in foreign currency. The economic decline of these years, however,
did affect those independent (nonstate) professionals who operated outside the NGO
sector, as they saw the disposable income of their potential clients decline.50
Kabul University, meanwhile, was turned into a battlefield in the 1990s and the
production of graduates completely stopped, although it continued in some of the
Afghan provinces. The number and quality of new graduates fell well below the
replacement level, particularly because of massive emigration.
Under the Taliban’s Emirate (1996–2001)
The conquest of Kabul by the Taliban in October 1996 dealt another blow to the
professional middle class. Initially the Taliban absorbed the government bureaucracy
almost as they found it, not least because those who had most to fear from them fled
before their advance.51 Even less likely to be professionally educated than the
mujahidin of the 1980s and 1990s before them, the Taliban appointed their own
members, usually mullahs, to senior positions and tasked the next layer of government
bureaucrats to advise them on technical issues. Because the cultural and political
distance between the professional bureaucrats and the Taliban was so much greater
than what had separated the Islamist factions of the mujahidin and the bureaucracy,
the Taliban government was characterized by significant friction between the top layer
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of government and the professionals working for it. However, the Taliban were able
to coerce the resistant and filled any vacant positions with Taliban, eliminating meri-
tocracy: “Recruitment and employment in the Taliban’s governmental offices was also
strange. The majority of the officials were titled as Mullah or Maulana, an honorary
religious title. Even in places where specialists were needed to carry out technical
projects, the majority of employees were barely literate Taliban or those known as
Mullah or Maulana.”52
Another wave of middle-class professionals started leaving the country, unwilling
to put up with the strictures imposed by the Taliban, particularly those regarding
women. Some of the middle class who could not afford to leave the country, such as
many female teachers, went underground.53 This life underground might have
strengthened the sense of a professional, middle-class identity opposed to the Taliban
and in general critical of the armed militias confronting each other throughout
Afghanistan. Universities continued to produce graduates in this period, although in
small numbers and without appropriate facilities.54 In their access to government jobs,
however, these graduates were discriminated against: “In a sensitive ministry such as
Foreign Affairs, if necessary, college graduates would be appointed after successful
completion of exams, whereas the Taliban were either directly appointed or occa-
sionally took a simple test. For example, [minister] Akhund would ask a Talib which
books he had read in school. Simply naming those books sufficed.”55
The Taliban mostly viewed the educated middle class with suspicion, as they did
anyone not religiously educated who claimed some influence or authority. “Techno-
crats” could only be allowed to play a role under Taliban supervision, although some
Taliban leaders, such as Mawlavi Rabbani, gave more leeway to professional civil
servants. The Taliban indeed tried to train their own professional cadres, although
with little success as the quality of training was low and the recruits had weak educa-
tional backgrounds.56 They also tried to Islamize the professions: for example, doctors
were expected to study religious subjects as well, even at the expense of scientific
subjects.57 This uneasy relationship of the middle classes with the Taliban worsened
over the years as the regime gradually consolidated control. In 2000, the Taliban
purged former leftists from the bureaucracy and the armed forces, while also sidelining
Pashtun nationalists. The Taliban also understood that they could not afford to pay
for a 400,000-person strong bureaucracy, nor did they need one, and so started
cutting jobs.58 The fact that even those who retained salaries were paid irregularly and
salaries for senior employees were curtailed contributed to the further demoralization
of the state-employed middle class. New rating tables that recognized the value of
non-Taliban senior professional employees were introduced only in 2000, a year before
the fall of the Taliban government.59
As pointed out in the previous section, the history of NGOs in Afghanistan started
in the late 1970s. Their numbers started rising quickly during the 1990s with the de
facto collapse of the Afghan state in 1992–93 and continued under the Taliban, as
NGOs started filling the gap created in the provision of services, as well as delivering
humanitarian assistance. By 2001, there were an estimated 300 NGOs active in
Afghanistan, and they were about to start playing an even more important social and
political role under the U.S. occupation.
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The Afghan Middle Class, 2001–2014: A Genetic Transformation
The Middle Class Falls Off the Radar
The displacement of the Taliban from power in November 2001 seemed suddenly
to relaunch the prospects of the professional middle class in Afghanistan, but with
major differences compared to their prospects under the developmental frameworks
of the republican 1970s and the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. As Afghanistan’s
international alignments dramatically changed, so also did the new Afghan govern-
ment’s economic policy. Any idea of a direct role of the state in the economy was
abandoned and replaced with the idea that the private sector would propel economic
growth. In this neoliberal vision the state had to limit itself to handling infrastructural
development and providing services, including education. This strategy included
creating an environment that could attract international investment and opening the
country to world trade.60 Afghanistan had never been good at implementing planned
forms of “disciplined development,” as described by Davis, but any notion of managed
or state-driven development was dropped altogether in 2001.61 Beyond this general
understanding, however, there was little coherence in terms of developing a concrete
strategy for reconstructing Afghanistan under NATO occupation. Various donors
followed their own priorities, which sometimes contradicted those of other, uncoordi-
nated donors.62 Nobody talked explicitly any more of the professional middle class.
Of the seven main factors of long-term economic growth identified in the National
Development Framework of 2002, only one, “strengthening the government’s capacity
for policy-making and implementation,” implied the absorption of new professional
skills into the state bureaucracy.63
Undisciplined Development: The Rise of the NGOs and of the Private Sector
A major change in the composition of the middle class after 2001 was the growing
role of NGOs as a source of employment. As shown above, the NGO phenomenon
was not new to the post-2001 period. However, only after 2001 did NGOs really
expand to employ a significant portion of the Afghan middle class. In early 2003 the
number of NGOs in Afghanistan had already risen to over 1,000.64 By 2005 there
were 2,400 of them and some estimates went as high as 3,000.65 It is very difficult to
estimate how many professional, middle-class Afghans might have been NGO
employees after 2001: one 2010 estimate was 72,000.66 Only a portion of these NGO
employees were university-educated professionals. However, the health sector was
largely taken over by NGOs, other than main hospitals and three of 34 provinces.
Many doctors, therefore, worked for NGOs by around 2010.67 Since NGOs actively
helped implement projects as well, some engineers found their way there. NGOs were
also active in more political fields, such as women’s rights and human rights. Their
growth after 2001, transforming service provision and opportunities available to
middle-class Afghans, was, again, mostly driven by donor countries routing funding
through them rather than the state.
An important parallel development was the emergence for the first time in Afghan
history of a powerful private sector, as the state withdrew from the economy and aid
organizations and Western militaries supplied large funds. The new Afghan business
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class (that is, the owners of large private companies) needed middle-class professionals
to staff offices and implement projects.68 Finally, a growing number of professionals
also started trying their luck on the free market, selling their services directly to the
public, particularly in the health sector.69
After 2001, therefore, the Afghan professional middle class rapidly divided into
four main sectors (aside from those who had fled the country and did not return after
2001): private sector (for-profit) employees; self-employed professionals (mostly
doctors and pharmacists); employees of NGOs and international organizations; state-
sector employees. This was in stark contrast to the 1970s, when the state enjoyed a
near monopoly of employment opportunities for the professional middle class. In the
1980s, as we saw, NGOs started emerging as an alternative, as did the armed oppo-
sition to the Soviet occupation, which also employed substantial numbers of middle-
class professionals in its own bureaucracy based in Pakistan. Only after 2001, however,
did this state monopoly truly collapse.
The Social Polarization of the Middle Class
The emergence of new alternatives to state employment does not imply that state
employment of university-educated Afghans declined in absolute terms: it continued
to rise rapidly. Universities were soon churning out rising numbers of graduates,
although of much lower quality than in the 1970s and even 1980s. A senior
government official reflected in 2013 that: “Our universities are a disaster—they don’t
even meet the standards of 1960s.”70 Many Afghans also enrolled in private universities
of varying quality; most were not much better than state universities.71 Finally, the
wealthiest sent their sons and sometimes daughters to study abroad in unprecedented
numbers.72 The state-employed middle class was thus not in absolute decline;
however, it was in relative decline, faced with a collapse of its perceived status in
society and with the rise in nonstate employment in NGOs and elsewhere. A real
decline of state employees’ salaries meant that few graduates working for the
government could afford a middle class standard of living with their salary alone.73
The growing number of graduates also far outstripped the number of employees the
state could afford to recruit. For those who graduated in Afghanistan, the employment
rate was estimated at just 10 percent, leaving many disappointed.74
The overall size of the pool of university-educated Afghans remains difficult to
estimate. Surveys have varyingly put it at somewhere between 0.4 percent and 2
percent of the adult population by 2007–2009. Of these surveys, the 0.4 percent
implicitly estimated by the survey of the Ministry of Labor seems most realistic.75 The
middle class as a whole was estimated as 10–15 percent of the population, including
an army of small shopkeepers.76 A salary of $200 was considered enough to be rated
lower middle class for these purposes, though this was insufficient to rent a family
house in the poorest neighborhoods of Kabul. Public sector wages reached up to a
mere $250/month, except for those trained in the West and offered higher salaries by
foreign donors.77
Despite the declining quality of the universities, their graduates wanted “middle-
class” standards of living, self-employment opportunities, and consumerism modeled
on Indian, Turkish, and European lifestyles advertised in movies and television serials,
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hugely popular after 2001. The emergence of a stronger and dynamic business sector
arguably contributed to the splintering of the professional middle class into diverging
sectors. State employees could only afford to compete for “middle-class” standards of
living by indulging in bribery and corruption.78 The exceptions were a few Western-
trained professionals, employed by the government at much higher salaries (paid by
donors).79
Self-employed professionals rarely found in the rising business class new clients
who could afford their services, as the wealthy typically relied on the services of foreign
professionals or traveled abroad. Arguably the emergence of a new middle class of self-
employed professionals was instead the consequence of the lower quality of
government-provided services, compared to the 1970s–80s, and of the declining
government salaries for educated professionals.
This independent middle class has therefore been weakly connected to the business
class, except for shared interest in economic growth, which enabled employees in the
private sector to buy services from the professional middle class (mainly in the health
sector). In post-2001 Afghanistan large businesses consisted of mobile telephone
companies, a few banks, and some construction companies, with very little interna-
tional participation except for a few joint ventures. Most of the members of this new
self-employed middle class were thus struggling economically and were not seen as a
threat to the status of the state-employed middle class.80
The state-employed middle class instead appears to have viewed the new business
class and the NGO sector with contempt and as the main causes of its own relative
social decline. The regular harassment to which the newly wealthy were subjected by
the state bureaucracy can be interpreted as the state-employed middle class exploiting
the scope offered by state positions, in part also to extract rents.81 Over time, arrange-
ments were worked out in which the business class accommodated state officials, with
both colluding to share rent in a regulated way at the expense of state coffers, as in
the case of custom posts.82 This meant that the Afghan state was less able than ever to
play any role in the development of the country, as development became even less
disciplined than the National Development Framework discussed above had planned
for.
Finally, the portion of the middle class employed by the private sector was rela-
tively privileged in terms of salaries paid, because of the shortage of adequately
competent professionals.83 The flow of foreign money and the import of new ideol-
ogies, stressing the preeminence of the private sector in the economy, contributed
therefore decisively to the emergence of a new middle class, no longer dependent on
state jobs for its economic survival. It is instructive to look at how this development
influenced middle-class politics.
Middle Class Politics
After 2001, the old political parties of the 1980s tried to remobilize their old
followers employed in the state bureaucracy, which we will describe here as the “old
middle class,” with some success. The membership of the successor parties to the
PDPA was therefore often made up of government officials. Similarly, in the cities the
Islamist parties that dominated the 1992–96 scene recruited people whom they had
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appointed into government jobs during their dominance in the 1990s onward. But
while the influence of the old leftists within the government bureaucracy had been
paramount in the 1970s, after 2001 the picture was much more fragmented, as a result
of the political vicissitudes of the 1990s. The leftists retained control over the trade
unions, which were weaker than in the 1970s. Most important, the state-employed
middle class was no longer as generally influential as before, because of the emergence
of a strong business sector and of nonstate-employed portions of the middle class. Any
state-centered strategy of reform, aimed at empowering the old middle class, was no
longer credible because of the changes to Afghanistan and its international alignment.
The privately employed middle class failed to get visibly involved in the political
debates of 2002–11, perhaps because of its relatively privileged status. Similarly, there
is little indication that the self-employed middle class had a major political impact.
After some signs of rising mobilization within the old middle class in 2005–9, the
defeat of the PDPA’s successor parties in the 2010 elections finished off 1970-style
middle-class politics. The politics of the 2010s were without precedent in their domi-
nation by money, sanctioning the entry into politics of a new business class, whose
riches often originated in the shadow economy. Demoralization ensued and party
membership fell.84 Even women activists of this generation were losing hope by 2010:
“The political parties are weak and are mostly not real. To attract people you have to
work hard, have public activities and offer them a future. There are exceptions, some
parties have youth wings. There is a strong female opposition to Shia family law, but
there is no real movement.”85
A combination of developments led almost by default to the new NGO sector’s
hegemony: the decline in status and isolation of the old middle class, as well as the
lack of politicization among the independent professional middle class and among the
privately employed middle class. Often benefiting from foreign (Western) patronage,
the NGOs themselves now became political actors, lobbying the government for
reform and expansion of NGO activity. A polarization emerged between some senior
state officials and the old middle class on one side and the NGO sector on the other.
The former argued in favor of the reestablishment of the pre-1978 model of the Afghan
state, with the direct state provision of services. The latter argued for keeping delivery
of essential services in its own hands indefinitely, not just as an emergency measure.86
Many NGOs also promoted gender rights and human rights, which state officials
found suspicious.87
Alongside NGOs, middle-class politics expressed itself through a myriad of what
international donors call Civil Society Organizations (CSO), which could not legally
register as NGOs and were estimated to number over 4,000 in 2009. One of the most
politically involved of the CSOs was the Herat Professional Shura, which in
2002–2004 challenged the warlord and Herat governor Ismail Khan.88
The NGO/CSO model attracted many educated Afghans because it implicitly
accepted that the middle class did not seek power for itself. This was realistic and
attractive to much of the new post-2001middle class, which, sheltered by international
intervention, shunned political involvement and focused on money. In this system
Western governments and donor agencies advocated civil and social rights, without
the middle class itself having to mobilize for them. Western governments and NGOs
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also often funded local NGOs, which could therefore function independently of their
underlying social structure and acquire a “vanguard” character.89 The 2002–11 period
was thus the heyday of the NGO middle class, which emerged as one of the key
transformative impacts of post-2001 foreign occupation.
New changes began in 2012. Middle-class segments previously politically dormant
mobilized politically, worried about the future of the country and about deflation of
the economic bubble created by foreign intervention.90 Thus 2012 saw the launch of
political movements explicitly rooted in the upper middle class and the business
class.91 But though they included several well-known individuals, their ability to reach
a large section of the population remained questionable.
If the upper end of the middle class was worried by 2012–13, the lower end had
started losing hope in the post-2001 system some years earlier. New graduates from
the country’s universities became particularly and increasingly frustrated by their
exclusion from the new wealth in Afghanistan. By 2009 the first signs of radicalization
appeared among the growing body of university students. Various anti-establishment
groups started attracting students, as they had done in the 1960s and 1970s, but this
time the hard left was noticeably absent. It was Islamic groups that dominated the
student scene from 2009 onward. Hizb-i Islami (Islamic party), a protagonist of
campus politics in the 1970s, remained influential in campuses like Nangarhar Univer-
sity’s, which it dominated together with Salafist groups (Islamic fundamentalists).92
By 2014, however, the landscape had changed significantly.93 In addition to rejecting
electoral politics, most of the Islamic groups considered the Afghan state illegitimate and
advocated its overthrow. Not unlike outcomes in some Middle Eastern and South Asian
countries, privileging a massive quantitative expansion of university education at the
expense of quality produced masses of aspiring lower-middle-class members, unem-
ployed, increasingly frustrated, and inclined toward radicalization.94 By 2013 there were
already some signs that this Islamist radicalization was affecting government structures,
as former students started to enter government employment.95
Conclusion
Narratives of the middle class as the protagonist of social and economic development
in Afghanistan reflected the dominant social and development theories of the 1960s,
as well as a social and political reality due substantially to political elites’ belief in
those theories in Afghanistan and beyond, and social theorists’ provision of theories
matching such elites’ expectations. Similarly, the post-1990 paradigm shift resulted
not just from academic debates but also from changing political realities, dialectically
entwined with those debates. Until 1991, intensified by the Soviet occupation, near
consensus existed inside Afghanistan about the need for state-led development,
managed by a state-employed professional middle class. But as early as 1978 this
narrative started fraying as political turmoil deeply affected the professional middle
class. The USSR-sponsored left maintained its predominant role within the profes-
sional middle class only through coercion, forcing many dissident members of that
class into exile. By controlling higher education, the leftist regime managed after a few
years to produce a new, more amenable professional middle class. At the same time,
however, many refugees abroad had an unprecedented opportunity to study in foreign
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universities. Although less apparent in the 1980s, the seeds of the internal fragmen-
tation of the middle class in social and political terms were thus planted. These would
germinate when those foreign-trained professionals returned to Afghanistan in the
wake of the NATO forces. This 1980s fragmentation of the middle class and the
dilution of its fidelity to state-led development increased as Afghan leftists remained
dependent on Soviet patronage, little imagining the impending Soviet implosion. The
sudden disappearance of that patronage in 1991 led to the collapse of the Afghan state.
The Soviet occupation of the 1980s, therefore, was undoubtedly “transformative,”
although mostly in ways unplanned and unexpected by the Soviets and their clients.
The new, “red” professional middle class created through Soviet patronage remained
an important component of the Afghan professional class well after 2001, and even its
natural enemies, like the Taliban and the jihadist parties of the 1980s, enlisted its
services.
Even if the Afghan state was reestablished in 2001–2002 in a form superficially
resembling its 1970s incarnation, in reality the old idea of state-led development was
dead. The professional middle class had suffered multiple emigrations in 1978, 1979,
1980, 1992, and 1996, making a return to the state-led development of the 1970s a
daunting prospect even had the political will existed. NATO and especially U.S. ideology
disdained state-led development in Afghanistan and the state was thus confined to a
supporting and regulatory role. In this new environment the professional middle class
refragmented in separate and sometimes rival “middle classes,” losing its pivotal role
of the 1960s and 1970s. The state-employed middle class remained nostalgic about an
era when it played a crucial role and often responded to its sociopolitical decline by
taking revenge on the new middle and wealthy classes by demanding increasingly
oppressive bribes. Gradually, portions of the old state-employed middle class were
incorporated in the new order through co-optation by the new privileged groups.
The new (at least in size) privately employed and independent professional middle
classes had substantially diverging interests compared to their state-employed
colleagues. They shared no interest in reestablishing a strong state and even less in an
authoritarian state with control over the economy. They also had little interest in
becoming politically active: while in the 1960s and 1970s the state-employed middle
class had a vested interest in pushing for accelerated state-led development, which
meant more jobs and power for them, the new middle classes mostly stayed away from
politics. In part this was due to things already going their way: breakneck growth of
the private sector, a degree of political liberalization, greater media freedom than ever,
and loosening social customs. But political engagement also did not appear likely to
bring them any benefit, contrary to the 1960s and 1970s, when the monarchy was
widely criticized for its weak leadership and management of state-led development, as
well as for its reluctance to fully involve the professional classes in running the state.
Arguably in the 2000s the weakness of the Afghan state and its limited role in
economic management deprived the middle classes of a major vector for political
mobilization. The exception to this rule of middle-class political disengagement under
NATO occupation was a particular section of the privately employed middle class, the
NGO sector. NGO activism in Afghanistan might have had several causes, not least
the fact that many NGOs were set up with an agenda to advance specific social and
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political rights, usually as defined in the Western hemisphere. President Karzai’s liber-
alism, therefore, was not liberal enough for most NGOs because he was willing to
compromise with conservative clerics. As of 2016, the questions were whether the
NGO sector would remain important after the impending Western withdrawal, and
what would be the fate of NGO-sponsored social and political rights.
The post-2001 occupation of Afghanistan by the Americans and their allies is turning
out to be transformative of Afghanistan mostly in unexpected, even unwanted ways, just
as the Soviet occupation before it. Western occupiers never seriously considered the
Soviet experience, let alone tried to learn from it—they saw themselves as liberators, and
the Soviets as invaders. Even if this distinction was true at least in part, many of the
dynamics unleashed by the two occupations were similar. While it is too early to say
how many of the changes wrought in occupied Afghanistan after 2001 will survive the
withdrawal, the social structure of Afghanistan has been substantially altered. As a result,
it is likely that some at least of the transformations could be permanent.
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